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The NFG Research Group “Asian Perceptions of the European Union” 
hosted its second Annual Conference and Academic Council meeting at the Observer 
Research Foundation (ORF) and the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, on 26-27 
September 2013. The conference was jointly organized by the NFG, the Jawaharlal Nehru 
University, the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi and the Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung-India. 
It was made possible by the generous funding of the Fritz Thyssen Foundation, 
the Friedrich Ebert Foundation and the German Ministry of Education and Research.1
Headed by Dr. May-Britt U. Stumbaum and advised by an international Academic Council, 
the Berlin-based NFG Research Group seeks to examine how the EU is perceived and 
assessed as a security actor in China and India by bringing together European, Chinese, 
and Indian academics and policy-makers working in this area in a Networked Think Tank 
(www.asianperception.eu). The conference was attended by 40 selected participants, 
including some of the most prominent academics working in this field in China, India, 
Japan and Europe, representatives of European embassies, and leading 
position holders in the military as well as the policy making establishment in New Delhi. 
The conference was held under Chatham House rules. This report provides a summary of 
the key themes which emerged from the conference.2 
Europe’s Role for Security 
in a Multipolar World:  
Views from India and China
pictures copyright ‚NFG‘.
„An excellent opportunity to outreach to the Indian intelligentsia regarding the role of the EU as 
a security actor. In India, the EU is not perceived as yet as an important player in that realm and 
hence it was a very timely event.”   Anne Marchal, Delegation of the European Union to India 
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Ambivalence towards the EU’s role as a security actor in a multipolar world: The EU is 
still inconsistent and lacks capabilities as a security actor, but its military power and 
willingness to intervene should not be underestimated. The EU’s insistence on 
multilateralism is a strength and does not necessarily limit Europe’s ability to 
shape global governance.
Perceptions shape assessments: Perceptions play an important role in shaping assess-
ments of the EU as a security actor. Differences in mutual perceptions stem not only 
from information deficits, but also from different historical trajectories and contexts. 
Different perceptions lie at the heart of a process of ‘othering’, leading to mutual 
misperceptions. These should be minimised as much as possible.
Context matters – the EU as a security actor in Asia: The EU needs to overcome a 
one-dimensional view of Asia as solely a region of vast economic opportunities, 
and must recognise the complex and varied security challenges in the region. 
The EU should focus on its existing strengths, for example in non-traditional security 
areas, and reorient its strategy as a security actor only where appropriate, striking a 
balance between strategic assertiveness and restraint.
The EU’s need to reorient its strategy as security actor in Asia vis-a-vis the US: Many par-
ticipants contrasted the roles of the EU and the US as security actors in a multipolar 
world in general, and in Asia in particular. Although the EU is recognised as a crucial 
economic actor in the region, the US has a higher profile as a security actor. 
Because of this, the EU needs to position itself more clearly vis-à-vis the US’s 
rebalancing strategy in the region, and should develop a clearly defined security 
model for Asia.
Strategic partnerships underperform: Discussion also focused on the role of strategic 
partnerships in shaping the EU’s security relations with India and China. There is no 
common understanding of what roles strategic partnerships can play: Do they have a 
distinct functionality for bilateral relations, or do they merely describe the means and 
rules of bilateral engagement? Discussion focused in particular on the EU-India 
strategic partnership, which has not yet lived up to its full potential. 
While the EU-China strategic partnership is less static than the EU-Indian one, 
it still lacks dynamism.
Most recent findings of NFG Research Group case studies discussed - peacekeeping and 
export controls: The NFG Research Group presented its most recent findings in two 
case studies on EU-Indian/EU-Chinese cooperation in peacekeeping and export 
control regimes. Distinguished experts from India, China, Japan, the EU and the US 
used break-out sessions to discuss and assess the results from extensive field research 
and the future research agenda.
Discussion Highlights - Executive Summary
The NFG Research Group “Asian Perceptions of 
the European Union” hosted its Third Annual 
Conference and Academic Council Meeting in 
New Delhi, on 26-27 September 20133. This third 
Annual Conference built upon the discussions 
and results of previous conferences in Berlin 
(2011) and Beijing (2012), and brought together 
a community of distinguished policy-makers 
and scholars from India, China, Japan, the Uni-
ted States and Europe to discuss and compare 
their perspectives on Asian perceptions of the 
EU as a security actor.
The conference also provided a platform to 
present the most recent findings from extensive 
field research in the NFG’s two core case stu-
dies: EU-Asian cooperation in (i) peacekeeping 
and (ii) export control regimes. Discussion also 
centred on the role of strategic partnerships, 
differences between the EU and the US model 
of security, as well as past, present and future 
roles for the EU as a security actor in Asia.
Keynote addresses were delivered by the Indian 
Minister of State for Information and Broad-
casting, Hon. Manish Tewari, and the EU Am-
bassador to India, H.E. João Cravinho. The dis-
cussions were held under the Chatham House 
rule. This report identifies the key themes that 
emerged from the conference.
1. On the Conference
“The Delhi conference put into sharp relief the mutual 
perceptions between India and the EU highlighting not 
only the Indian focus (excessive by European standards) 
on military power in assessing the EU, but also the 
European failure to devote attention to Indian affairs 
commensurate to India‘s importance.“
   Karl Kaiser, Harvard
3  As an online resource, detailed information on the research agenda of the NFG, publications in 
the form of Working Papers, as well as a comprehensive bibliography providing access to the latest 
research in the case countries is available on the group’s website, www.asianperceptions.eu.
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The central theme of the conference was how 
the EU is perceived as security actor in Asia, 
especially among scholars and policy-makers in 
India and China. Indian, Chinese and European 
experts shared their insights on: the role of per-
ception when judging the EU as a security actor; 
how the EU’s complexity impacts on foreign 
relations; the ‘soft power’ vs. ‘hard power’ image 
of the EU and its limited role in traditional 
security matters in Asia; the EU’s security role 
vis-à-vis NATO and other regional/bilateral se-
curity arrangements; the merits and drawbacks 
of multilateralism and bilateralism; the EU’s 
view on interventionism and responsibility to 
protect (R2P); the current state of the EU-India 
and EU-China strategic partnerships and future 
prospects; the EU’s need and ongoing attempt 
to rebalance its relations with India and China; 
the positioning on export controls and peace-
keeping and the future research agenda on 
these issues; and the different ways the EU and 
the US imagine their role as security actors, in 
general, and in Asia in particular.
2.1 Perceptions of the EU as a 
Limited Security Actor
Indian participants highlighted the importance 
of the EU as a historical experiment in inte-
gration and peace-building as well as the contri-
bution of European intellectual discourse to the 
political trajectory of many countries in South 
Asia. India and Europe have a long history of 
relations, share common cultural values such as 
democracy, and the EU is India’s largest trading 
partner. At the same time, however, the Indian 
view of the EU as a security actor in today’s 
multipolar world is less enthusiastic. From the 
Indian perspective, European security capabili-
ties still reside with individual EU member sta-
tes, and the EU’s emphasis on multilateralism 
and supranational institutions collides with the 
Indian focus on sovereignty and bilateralism. 
The EU’s engagement with India, as well as the 
Asian continent more broadly, is largely played 
out in the realm of soft power. From a security 
perspective, this is generally seen as non-conse-
quential and directionless.
An EU delegate acknowledged the Indian 
perception that the EU has an ‘agency deficit’, 
especially in security matters, and agreed that 
for a long time, the EU has been regarded as a 
trade bloc. However, the EU’s lack of agency and 
willingness is only part of the story and Indian 
preferences matter as well: does India truly 
wish to engage with the EU more thoroughly? 
India is changing its policy of non-alignment 
and starting to shoulder its responsibility as 
an emerging power, but the EU so far does 
not figure prominently in India’s foreign policy 
considerations. India should reconsider its view 
in that regard.
2. Key Theme: The EU as a Security Actor in a Multipolar World 2. Key Theme: The EU as a Security Actor in a Multipolar World
Chinese participants largely shared the view of 
their Indian colleagues, viewing the EU as an 
economic giant, and a political dwarf. The EU 
doesn’t have a clear position on how to engage 
China politically and must learn how to translate 
its huge economic assets into geo-economic 
tools. In contrast to the predominant view 
among the Indian participants, however, one 
Chinese participant viewed the EU’s image as a 
civilian or soft power as an asset. Considering the 
nexus between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ security issues, 
the EU’s perceived strategic weakness in traditio-
nal security matters gives it more leverage when 
dealing with non-traditional security challenges. 
This last point resonated with the view of some 
Indian participants who see the EU not as a 
fully-fledged security actor, but as a public goods 
provider.
2.2 Divisions among the EU 
and Member States
There was a general consensus among Indian 
and Chinese participants that the lack of clarity 
regarding the EU’s positioning and capability 
as a security actor largely results from the lack 
of a common understanding between the EU 
and its member states. The EU is not perceived 
as an effective actor in its own right. With their 
preference for bilateralism in security matters, 
both India and China would rather continue to 
deal with the individual member states. One 
Indian participant put it as follows: “If India can 
deal with the EU member states with which it has 
traditionally enjoyed good relations, what is the 
added value of the EU?” 
Differences in foreign and security policy bet-
ween the EU and its member states are most 
visible when it comes to questions of interven-
tion, defence integration and cooperation. The 
diverging interests of EU member states were 
highlighted with regard to interventions (e.g. 
with reference to the case of Syria). Both Asian 
and European participants agreed that bilateral 
cooperation takes priority in defence cooperation, 
due to the fact that member states are competi-
tors and are much more active diplomatically in 
India compared with the EU. There is also a lack 
of clarity regarding the EU’s security role vis-à-vis 
NATO, the US and other regional security arran-
gements. India and China largely view the EU as 
a security actor through the prism of NATO.
The EU is not seen 
as a fully-fledged 
security actor, 
but as a public goods 
provider and 
therefore more 




2. Key Theme: The EU as a 
Security Actor 
in a Multipolar World
„The conference allowed us to debate, discuss and 
tease out common objectives and some disagree-
ments between the regions. Indian perceptions are 
overwhelmingly shaped by a euro-skeptic English 
media. Ultimately the cleavage is not one of a secu-
rity and Realpolitik obsessed India and a (perceived) 
de-securitised Europe, but rather of a values based 
discourse and needs based discourse”
    Samir Saran, ORF
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2.3 European Strengths 
are Underestimated
European participants conceded that the EU still 
displays inconsistency and a lack of capabilities 
as a security actor, due to the fact that it is an 
evolving project and the sum of its parts. They 
also highlighted that this view is largely reflected 
in the European discourse on the EU as well. 
However, some caveats were mentioned with 
regard to this perception. On the one hand, the 
EU’s military power and willingness to intervene 
should not be underestimated. The missions in 
the Balkans, in Somalia and Operation Atalanta 
have shown that the EU is able and willing to 
deploy military assets against security challenges 
on its own. These interventions are also of major 
importance to global security. On the other hand, 
the EU’s insistence on multilateralism is also a 
strength and does not limit the EU’s effectiveness 
in shaping global governance.  Multilateralism 
helps to integrate smaller and larger powers and 
offers a solution to the security dilemma.
The discussions highlighted the role of percep-
tion in the assessment of the EU as a security 
actor. While one Indian participant acknowledged 
that, to a certain extent, the EU and India share 
similar perceptions of security at the internatio-
nal level (e.g. a stable Middle East, a stable Afgha-
nistan), their approach to addressing these needs 
has different normative underpinnings: ‘You 
call it values, we call it interests’. This reflected 
discussion at the NFG Research Group’s Beijing 
conference on the distinction between a ‘norma-
tive Europe’ and a ‘realist India’. 
2.4 Underlying Causes of 
Mutual Misperception
Participants also discussed the causes of differing 
perceptions of oneself and of each other, noting 
the importance not just of information deficits, 
but also different historical trajectories and con-
texts. Asian minds, as one participant noted, are 
still set on massive domestic development needs 
and historical injustice that reflect on a perceived 
power asymmetry at the international level, ge-
nerating different perceptions of security. Diffe-
ring perceptions based on an information deficit 
may be easier to tackle. One Indian participant’s 
statement that Indians would prefer UN to EU 
missions could thus be immediately countered 
by the clarification that UN and EU missions 
don’t exclude each other and that in many EU 
member states, non-UN missions would not be 
authorised. ‘Othering’ is also responsible for mu-
tual misperceptions, which not only determine 
EU-India or EU-China relations, but also play an 
extremely important role in the way these Asian 
powers perceive each other. For example, one 
Chinese participant highlighted the fact that, ac-
cording to surveys, over 65% of Indians consider 
China as a security threat and 80% of Indians 
want India to join other countries to keep China 
in check.  
2. Key Theme: The EU as a Security Actor in a Multipolar World
Echoing the NFG’s 2012 Annual Conference in 
Beijing, participants at this year’s conference 
agreed that there is no such thing as ‘one Asia’, 
and that security varies across the region. As one 
participant put it, referring to a recent Foreign 
Policy article, there are two Asias, one ‘Economic 
Asia’ which is highly dynamic and integrated, and 
another ‘Security Asia’ with a variety of territorial 
disputes, rising nationalism and growing dist-
rust. These two Asias no longer run in parallel. 
Secondly, there are a host of different regional 
security challenges, and different views about the 
best strategies to deal with them. Any greater 
role for the EU as a security actor in Asia must 
take into account the potentially controversial 
China-US relationship as well as India’s careful 
guarding of its strategic autonomy. 
Participants also highlighted that, as a result of 
globalisation, security matters in the region have 
stability consequences well beyond the region. 
This conclusion led one Chinese participant to 
emphasise that nowadays, there is a much stron-
ger nexus between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ security issues 
in the region, such as in the field of energy or 
water management.
3.1 Challenges for the EU 
as a Security Actor in Asia
There was a general consensus that the EU has 
been, and remains, an important economic and 
commercial player in the Asian region. In terms 
of security, however, Indian and Chinese partici-
pants highlighted the EU’s strategic weakness in 
its previous dealings with Asian security challen-
ges. Individual member states have a conside-
rable military presence in the region. Examples 
include military dialogues, joint exercises, arms 
sales, technology transfers, Asian participation 
in the Galileo global navigation satellite system, 
French military deployments in the Indian Oce-
an, and British participation in the Five Power 
Defense Arrangement. Nonetheless, China and 
India, remain doubtful about the EU’s military 
capacity, and are reluctant to accept a greater EU 
role as a security actor in Asia.
According to Indian and Chinese participants, 
this assessment is largely due to the complexity 
of security challenges in Asia and the EU’s lack of 
research capacity which would enable it to grasp 
Asian perceptions of security challenges. In the 
case of disputes in South Asia, for example, India 
believes in bilateralism and would be reluctant to 
accept any kind of EU intervention or mediation. 
One participant cited the 2001-02 India-Pakistan 
standoff, which saw Indian annoyance at the 
involvement of EU member states in persua-
ding it not to go to war. Likewise, any greater 
involvement of the EU in Chinese security 
matters would have to carefully acknowledge the 
prerogative of US-China relations first; China’s 
economic and military preponderance in Asia; as 
well as the delicate balance of intra-Asian power 
relations, above all the India-China relationship.
3. ‘Past, Present and Future’ – the EU as a Security Actor in Asia
In Asia, the focus is on 
massive domestic 
development needs 
and historical injustice 
that reflect on a 
perceived asymmetry 
at the international 
or global level.
3. ‘Past, Present and Future’: 
The EU as a Security Actor 
in Asia-Pacific
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3.2 Opportunities to 
Strengthen the EU Role 
in Asian Security
Discussions also aimed to identify ways and areas 
for the EU to engage further with China and 
India. Summarising the discussion so far, one 
European participant concluded that in order 
to do justice to the ‘two Asias’, the EU needs to 
overcome a one-dimensional view of Asia solely 
as a region of vast economic opportunities, and 
must realise the importance of security, especially 
in South Asia. However, aside from Afghanistan 
and severe future security challenges, the EU 
cannot act as an ‘offshore balancer’ in Asia in the 
same way as the US, and would encounter reluc-
tance from Asian powers if it sought to do so.
The EU should focus on its existing strengths, 
including in non-traditional security areas, and 
should reorient its strategy as a security actor 
only where appropriate, i.e. to strike a balance 
between strategic assertiveness and strategic 
restraint. The EU could promote the historical 
experience of its evolution and European peace-
keeping efforts more thoroughly in Asia. In that 
regard, one participant highlighted how the 
experience of people-to-people contacts and 
discussions about historical memories involved 
in Franco-German reconciliation which could 
act as a blueprint to counteract nationalism 
and chauvinism in Asia. Moreover, European 
successes in solving complex governance issues 
could be applied to similar problems in Asia. 
For example, the international management of 
the Brahmaputra and Mekong rivers could be 
compared to the Danube Commission. As an 
advocate for effective multilateralism, the EU 
could also provide more impetus to the building 
of multilateral institutions in Asia where there 
is a demand for regulation and where issues 
of sovereignty can be set aside. The EU should 
continue and intensify its existing efforts in non-
traditional security fields such as climate change, 
development cooperation, science and technolo-
gy. This is especially important given the growing 
nexus between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ security issues in 
the region. In the military field, it was sugges-
ted that the EU should intensify its confidence 
building measures (CBMs) through joint military 
exercises, exchange of observers, multi-national 
trainings, and establishment of communications 
systems to build mutual trust.
There was a general consensus that the EU is not 
comparable to the US as a security actor, neither in 
terms of its military capacity, force projection and 
foreign policy vision, nor in terms of its willingness 
and capacity to act as an ‘offshore balancer’. Where 
the US emphasises the principles of sovereign-
ty and bilateralism in its security relations and is 
more easily convinced of the need for intervention, 
the EU focuses on multilateral solutions, stresses 
the importance of supranational institutions, and 
usually is extremely reluctant when it comes to the 
question of intervention. As one Indian participant 
put it rather bluntly, referring to interventionism: 
‘We are all free riders, giving advice to the US. We 
don’t have to do the dirty work; don’t have to take 
the responsibility.’ Most participants also agreed 
that the Indian and Chinese security perspectives 
are much closer to the US than the EU model. As 
a consequence, the US model for security in Asia 
is taken much more seriously by Asian powers and 
the US figures much more prominently in India’s 
and China’s foreign policy considerations. 
In the view of one Chinese participant, the attempt 
of the US to promote a stronger role for the EU in 
Asia was also motivated by the US’s rebalancing 
strategy. It benefits the US in several ways. First, 
it broadens the room to manoeuvre for the US by 
reducing economic dependence on China in the 
region,. Second, expanding strategic partnerships 
with likeminded actors, such as Japan, it helps to 
enhance the US ‘hubs and spokes’ alliance system 
geared towards keeping China in check. Third, 
integrating the EU in regional security initiatives 
facilitates making rules in global commons like 
freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.
Indian participants also expressed their bewilder-
ment at the lack of clarity of the EU’s strategy as a 
security actor in Asia, especially compared to the 
US. For example, one Indian participant raised 
questions about the EU’s position regarding poten-
tial burden-sharing with the US when intervention 
becomes imminent, or whether there would be a 
division of work between the EU as a civilian power 
and NATO as a military actor. Indian participants 
also lamented the European emphasis on multi-
lateralism and supranational institutions as being 
opposed to India’s adherence to bilateralism and 
the principle of sovereignty which also guide US 
strategic thinking. As a result of this and the EU’s 
lack of strategic clarity in Asia, India is much more 
comfortable in its security dealings with the US – 
and even individual EU member states – than with 
the EU.
Both, Indian and Chinese participants agreed that 
there is a need for the EU to position itself more 
clearly vis-à-vis the US’s strategy in the region and 
to find areas where it can coordinate its security ef-
forts with the US. In addition, if it wants to be taken 
more seriously as a security actor in Asia, the EU 
must develop a clearly-defined security model for 
Asia and, like the US, must invest in marketing this 
model as a new message. Referring to India, one 
European participant remarked that India wants 
to be seen as more than a big market, but the EU 
plays little or no role in defence matters or strategic 
relations.
3. ‘Past, Present and Future’ – the EU as a Security Actor in Asia 4. ‘The EU vs. the US’ – Two Different Models of Security for Asia?
The US model 
for security in Asia is 
taken much more 
seriously by Asian 
powers; the US figures 
much more promi-
nently in India’s and 
China’s foreign policy 
considerations.
Lack of a clear 
European strategy 
in Asia is seen 
as a major 
problem in India.
In order to do justice 
to the ‘two Asias’ 
the EU needs to 
overcome the 
one-dimensional view 
that sees Asia only as 
region of vast 
economic opportu-
nities and realise the 
importance of security 
in Asia and change its 
policy accordingly.
4. ‘The EU vs. the US’: 
Two Different Models of 
Security for Asia? 
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The role of strategic partnerships in determining 
the EU’s security relations with India and China 
is extremely important. There was no common 
understanding among the participants as to what 
exactly strategic partnerships are, and whether 
they have a distinct functionality for bilateral 
relations or merely describe the rules of bilateral 
engagement. The term is used in an inflationary 
way, it lacks conceptual clarity and very often 
lacks a clear strategy. One participant went as far 
as asking whether ‘strategic partnership’ is actu-
ally a term used more by scholars than by the EU 
itself. Others maintained that the role of strategic 
partnerships should not be underestimated. They 
are more than just a ‘signalling device’ and have 
the capacity to upgrade bilateral relations qualita-
tively.
On the one hand, it was argued that strategic 
partnerships help to strengthen bilateral re-
lations that cannot be accommodated in any 
other forum (e.g. the EU’s strategic partnerships 
with Russia or China). Moreover, regulations 
regarding common goods would be difficult to 
accomplish without preceding cooperation and 
agreement within strategic partnerships. On the 
other hand, strategic partnerships may under-
mine multilateral negotiations, providing a dis-
incentive for individual partners to cooperate in 
regional or global fora. The strategic partnerships 
between India or China and individual EU mem-
ber states thus have the potential to undermine 
cooperation at the EU level.
5.1 The EU-India Strategic 
Partnership: Great Expecta-
tions, Lack of Delivery
The discussion focused on the EU-India strategic 
partnership. Launched almost ten years ago and 
one of 30 strategic partnerships India has entered 
into with different partners, the EU-India strate-
gic partnership has yet to take off. Despite great 
expectations, its lack of delivery, especially in the 
field of security, was linked to diverging interests 
and priorities, a lack of commitment, different 
views on security, a lack of capacity and resources 
and mutual misperceptions. The partnership 
still has a mainly economic rationale, with more 
than 100 of the 400 items of cooperation listed 
belonging to economic cooperation. In addition, 
other areas of cooperation remain overshadowed 
by the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations 
launched in 2007, the progress of which has been 
sluggish at best. There has been no deepening 
on selected issues and no real strengthening of 
the political dimension of the partnership. As one 
participant put it, no concrete projects have come 
into existence so far despite a lot of intentions.
Discussions identified a range of causes: the lack 
of capacity and resources on the Indian side; the 
low visibility of the EU in India, especially com-
pared to the diplomatic activities of EU member 
states; India’s preference for dealing with in-
dividual member states; diverging interests of 
individual EU member states; India’s preference 
for inter-governmental instead of company-level 
interaction in the area of defence cooperation; 
and the fact that the EU has not delivered on 
crucial security arrangements (e.g. intelligence 
sharing through EUROPOL).However, the lack of 
deliverables in the EU-India strategic partnership 
have deeper causes, including in the realm of 
perception, in different views on security, and 
information deficits on both sides. For India, the 
EU is not a credible security actor, one that is 
able and willing to exert ‘hard power’. In additi-
on, the EU is largely seen as ‘Europe’ in a general 
and non-institutionalised sense. The EU, as one 
participant put it, still has to make up its mind 
what to expect from a strategic partnership. For 
example, does the EU see India as a regional lea-
der, a global actor, or merely a trading partner.
Indian participants, however, expressed cautious 
optimism regarding the future potential of the 
EU-India strategic partnership, pointing to a qua-
litative change in cooperation between the EU 
and India over the past decade. There has been 
a greater normative convergence, and India is 
seen as a real partner rather than a development 
aid recipient. If the FTA can be consolidated and 
greater knowledgeable constituencies can be 
created, there are vast opportunities for increased 
cooperation, especially in maritime security and 
non-traditional security fields.
5.2 The EU-China Partnership: 
Deeper but still Facing 
Challenges
The EU-China strategic partnership was seen as 
less static than the Indian one, but also lacking in 
dynamism. Similar to the EU-India partnership, 
China sees the EU as an effective economic actor, 
but has doubts about the EU’s credentials as a 
global security actor. But the ongoing debt crisis 
challenges the positive view of the EU. This was 
seen as a dangerous scenario because it threa-
tens the economic foundations of the EU-China 
partnership, thus endangering future political 
cooperation. A Chinese participant attributed the 
operational difficulties in the EU-China strategic 
partnership to diverging interests of the various 
EU member states, as well as to differences 
in the EU and Chinese definition of strategy. 
Whereas China’s strategic outlook is long-term, 
comprehensive and principled, the EU’s focus is 
more on the operational level and on short- to 
medium-term feasibility. However, China is also 
limited in its policy options as a result of its in-
ternal problems, its governance deficit in the face 
of a rising and aspiring middle class and growing 
urbanisation. As in the case of the EU-India 
partnership, closer cooperation in non-traditional 
security fields was deemed as a more feasible way 
forward than traditional security cooperation. The 
setting up of an EU-China environment union 
was therefore identified as a desirable as well 
as manageable mid-term task for the EU-China 
partnership.
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The conference also provided the opportunity for 
the NFG Research Group to present and discuss 
findings of the project’s two case studies: peace-
keeping and export controls. NFG researchers 
Garima Mohan and Olivia Gippner introduced 
their comparative model of Indian, Chinese and 
EU approaches to peacekeeping, highlighting 
particularly the model’s criteria for comparison, 
i.e., policy decision and operationalisation. The 
model served as the basis for their six months 
of field research in India and China where they 
conducted interviews with decision-makers, aca-
demics, security think tank personnel, and Indian 
army representatives. 
NFG researchers Jizhou Zaho and Florian Britsch 
first provided an overview of the state of research 
on export controls in China and India, before de-
scribing major current multilateral export control 
regimes, the main actors in the decision-making 
process of China’s and India’s export control, and 
recent developments in the countries’ national 
law and regulation systems. They introduced 
their interview questionnaires, access to interview 
partners, and presented preliminary findings 
with special reference to India’s relationship with 
the Nuclear Suppliers Group and China’s policy 
towards the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea (DPRK).
In the subsequent discussion it was pointed out 
that, historically, Indian and Chinese views on 
peacekeeping differed widely, and that the re-
search on peacekeeping should focus not only on 
current policy decisions on peacekeeping and the 
actual implementation of peacekeeping missions 
on the ground, but should also take a historical 
view. In a comparative model, each actor’s atti-
tude towards R2P could be a test case for further 
research on Indian and Chinese approaches to 
peacekeeping. This may also shed light on their 
acceptance of, or reluctance towards, multilateral 
negotiations in this area.
With reference to the export controls case study, 
which is based on the hypothesis that there may 
be a diffusion of international export control 
norms from the EU to domestic legislation in 
China and India, questions were raised about the 
role of external factors. These included pressure 
exerted by the US to convince China to pursue 
an enhanced engagement with the DPRK, or 
to convince India to join international export 
control regimes. Participants largely agreed that 
both India and China want to be more visible as 
responsible global actors in export controls. This 
opens up the possibility that they would give up 
any previously-held revisionist agenda, instead 
acting more as status-quo powers willing to deal 
with, and eventually accept, international norms 
of nuclear non-proliferation and export controls 
regarding dual-use goods and technologies. 
However, participants also agreed that, to date, 
the EU has made little effort to interact more 
thoroughly with India or China on export cont-
rols (though more interaction took place between 
China and individual EU member states). 
This may be due partly to the fact that both India 
and China prefer an exchange of views on equal 
terms rather than being taught by others. Lastly, 
it was suggested that further research in the area 
should explore how exactly EU member states 
have fared in promoting export control norms in 
India and China. Furthermore, the EU Code of 
Conduct on Arms Exports should be scrutinised 
and contrasted with national arms export control 
policies, whose modes of decision-making and 
the actors involved therein deserve further 
attention.
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“For those of us not familiar with India and the 
views on international relations by Indian foreign 
policy elites, this was a fascinating conference. 
Particularly interesting to me was the enormous 
perception and knowledge gap between Indian views 
on the EU, on the one hand, and the assessments by 
EU scholars, on the other” 
 Thomas Risse, Freie Universität Berlin
“The conference offered a necessary platform for 
Indian and Chinese scholars to communicate their 
opinions about EU‘s role in Asia as a security actor, 
and we quite quickly realized that our views were 
very diversified on the issue”
 Zhao Chen, CASS
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Objective of the event: 
To look through Asian views 
of the EU as a security actor 
and correct misconceptions 
about European security 
policy.
„Thank you for the invitation 
and the warm welcome. 
I am very pleased to join you today on the occasion of 
this highly interesting event. Before starting, allow me to 
express my appreciation for ORF, the Jodhpur National 
University, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, NFG and, 
lastly, the Free University of Berlin, for organising this in-
itiative to provoke a discussion on EU‘s role as a security 
actor in a multi-polar world. I am certain that we could 
draw some very useful conclusions on how the EU could 
contribute more to guaranteeing security in the world 
and, more specifically, in the region.  
I was asked to make a short speech on EU‘s role as a 
security actor in a multi-polar world. I am aware that 
there is sometimes scepticism in India, as to whether the 
EU can be considered and treated as a security actor. I 
should say that this scepticism is probably greater in In-
dia than it is in other parts of Asia, and I believe that this 
is because too often there is confusion between security 
and defence, which results in security instruments being 
confused with military hardware. Security instruments 
are in fact much wider than that, and we can easily illus-
trate this with reference to Europe’s own history. 
Europe‘s biggest success is to emerge as an example 
of stability, co-operation and integration after the 
catastrophe of World War II. NATO of course played an 
important role in the context of the Cold War, but what 
transformed Europe from the battleground which it was 
for centuries was the process of deep integration that has 
resulted in the EU. Last year we received the Nobel Peace 
Prize and it was through recognition of the deepest sense 
of the European process of integration as a peace project. 
The security which Europeans enjoy today, security in the 
most traditional sense of safety from external attack, is a 
direct result of European integration.
Our historical experience as Europeans, and our genetic 
experience as members of the European Union, gives us 
a profound sense of the relevance of non-military instru-
ments of security. I do not wish to say that military inst-
ruments are no longer relevant for contemporary security 
challenges. This is not at all the case. But what i will say 
is that contemporary security challenges can rarely be 
addressed through military instruments alone, and this 
is where we have an experience and a vocation that few 
others can claim to have. 
Security in the European Union is ensured through 
our deep integration, but the process of responding to 
security challenges around the world obviously has to 
have other instruments. Over the almost six decades 
of evolution since the Treaty of Rome, we have seen a 
constant process of recognition that our interaction with 
the external world required the development of new inst-
ruments, and the issue of international security is a case 
in point. By carrying out consecutive institutional reforms 
over various decades, it has been possible to establish 
the EU as a security actor with significant contributions 
around the world.
In a nutshell, the 1992 Treaty of the EU – the Maastricht 
Treaty – established for the first time a set of principles 
that guide the EU‘s external policies, such as support of 
democracy and rule of law, human rights and respect 
of International Law. At the same time, it has defined 
several ambitious goals for the EU, such as to prevent 
conflicts, foster sustainable economic growth and promo-
te an international system based on stronger multilateral 
cooperation and good global governance. Sometime later, 
in 2003, the European Security Strategy was adopted, 
introducing the basic philosophical principles of the 
EU‘s security policy. Its significance lies on the fact that 
it creates a new perception of security in today‘s multi-
polar and interconnected world, updating our understan-
ding in order to correspond to a greatly changed world. 
Although traditional security challenges remain, and of 
course India knows this well, a new series of global chal-
lenges and security threats (the spill-over from regional 
conflicts, terrorism, state failure, organised crime and 
disease, to name a few) cannot be adequately addressed 
by military means alone, but require a mixture of military, 
political and economic tools. Sudan, Afghanistan and 
Somalia provide some good examples. These principles 
and concerns were encompassed in the EU‘s CFSP and 
CSDP. In short, one of the strengths of the European ap-
proach resides in its ability to combine military, political 
and diplomatic tools, and it is this that has allowed us to 
become the decisive actor in various security challenges, 
especially but not exclusively on the African continent and 
of course on the European continent as well.
In the meantime the EU continued to evolve, strengthe-
ning and deepening our capabilities in the fields of 
foreign policy and security. In particular, the Lisbon 
Treaty, which came into effect in 2009, has been a 
landmark, providing the necessary ingredients for the 
EU to strengthen its position as a security actor in line 
with our understanding of security. Our principles and 
concerns were unchanged, but our institutional capacity 
was considerably enhanced. In particular I would like to 
underline, amongst other institutional innovations, the 
establishment of the post of High Representative and 
Vice President, currently Baroness Catherine Ashton, and 
the creation of a full-fledged diplomatic corps, the Euro-
pean External Action Service, with some 3600 personnel 
in 141 missions around the world.
 
With regard to new security threats on the ground, 
conflict and threat prevention lie at the root of the EU‘s 
preferred security policy. Occasionally it is necessary to 
have emergency security interventions, using military 
hardware, and I shall return to that in a moment, but the 
preferred focus of the EU is to address the root causes of 
conflict and instability by strengthening governance and 
Human Rights, and by assisting economic development 
through such means as trade and foreign assistance. 
Indeed, the EU possesses a considerable repertoire of ci-
vilian, ‚soft power‘ tools. This is what enables us to play a 
key role in one of the greatest security-related challenges 
facing international diplomacy, the EU3+3 on the Iran 
nuclear issue. We are a major economic power, regardless 
of current difficulties, and we provide well over than 50% 
of world‘s development aid in the world.  
But we do not ignore the fact that in this world military 
hardware and armed forces also have a role, and over the 
years the EU has developed considerable capacity in this 
field. Over the years, in the context of our CSDP, we have 
completed 13 Missions and operations (among them 3 
military and 1 civilian-military). Just by way of illustrati-
on allow me to mention:
- Aceh Monitoring Mission. A civilian mission, initially 
consisted of around 80 people, reduced in 2006 to 36 
monitors. It monitored the implementation of various 
aspects of the peace agreement (ASEAN countries, as well 
as Norway and N. Zealand, contributed to the Mission).
- EU Support to AMIS (Darfur).  A civilian-military action 
to support the African Union‘s enhanced Mission to 
Darfur, AMIS, at the request of the AU (2005 – 2007). 
Approximately 30 police officers, 15 military experts and 
2 military observers participated.
- EUFOR RD Congo. A Military Operation in support 
of the UN Mission in Congo during the election process 
( July – November 2006).
Today, the EU is present with 17 Missions and ope-
rations, in Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Asia, 
covering a wide range of fields, such as border security, 
post-conflict reconstruction, security sector reform, 
judicial and police training and counter-piracy. 4 of these 
missions are military (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mali, and 
Somalia on land and at sea). In total we have about 
2830 military personnel currently in action, as well as a 
number of naval vessels and some air capacity.
The other 13 on-going Missions are civilian, and among 
them we find:
- EUPOL Afghanistan (EU Police Mission), which started 
in 2007, providing policing expertise and supporting poli-
ce reform. It has 350 international and 200 local staff.
- EUAVSEC South Sudan (started in June 2012). It 
provides support to strengthening the security at Juba 
International Airport. When it reaches its full capacity, it 
will comprise 44 international and 23 local staff.
-  EU Monitoring Mission (civilian) Georgia, since Octo-
ber 2008.
- EUJUST LEX Iraq, since 2005. It is the EU‘s first integ-
rated rule of law Mission.“
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„ Ladies and gentlemen,
It is worthwhile to say a bit more at this point about 
a field that is of great interest and usefulness for India 
interest, counter-piracy, where the EU has assumed an 
important role. The protection of the Gulf Area from 
piracy is of high importance for Indian interests in 
terms of trade and for the security of sea-farers (7% of 
the world‘s seafarers are Indian). There is an on-going 
Counter-Piracy dialogue between the EU and India, and 
the most recent meeting earlier this month in Brussels 
was very successful, and both sides are exploring ways of 
enhancing their co-operation in this area. EU NAVFOR, 
also known as Operation Atalanta, is the biggest single 
anti-piracy operation in the Indian Ocean, and it has 
been ongoing since December 2008. It has been very 
successful, as can be seen from the numbers. Pirates 
captured 47 vessels and their crews in 2010. By 2011 the 
number has reduced, but 25 vessels were still held by 
pirates. In December 2012 EU NAVFOR registered only 
4 ships as captured. Since 2011 the number of hostages 
dropped from up to 680 to 114 in December 2012. Today 
we know of only 1 vessel being held, and a total of 54 
sailors held hostage. If we look at the number of attacks, 
we see the same radical decline: 176 attacks in 2011, 35 in 
2012 and 3 this year (up to 20 September).
But this is not only about dry numbers. Looking at this 
year alone there are 24 Indian citizens who are alive 
because of Operation Atalanta: 10 Indian fishermen were 
rescued after the sinking of their boat, off the Somali 
coast, in January; and 14 Indian fishermen were rescued 
after their dhow was attacked by pirates, in the Gulf of 
Aden, in June.
Of course, as all of us know, pirates were born on land, 
and the conditions that allow piracy to happen are 
conditions on land, in Somalia. That is why the EU is 
combining Operation Atalanta with a three-pronged 
strategy for supporting Somalia, including military, 
diplomatic and economic tools. In military terms we are 
training the Somali army in camps in Uganda, and they 
have now been able to return to their own country and 
progressively increase the area under government control, 
driving back Al-Shabab and other Islamist radicals. We 
have now also developed EUCAP Nestor, a mission to 
promote regional capacity building in the Horn of Africa. 
This will develop the civilian coastal policing capacity 
in Somalia and strengthen the coastguard function in 
Djibouti, Kenya, the Seychelles and Tanzania. It will also 
reinforce those countries’ ability to fight piracy and face 
other challenges such as illegal fishing and trafficking).
Diplomatically we have provided the major pillar of sup-
port for the re-establishment of the state in Somalia. We 
have worked hard to help Somalia establish institutions 
such as a functioning Parliament, a government, and a 
legitimately elected President.
And economically we have been the major provider of de-
velopment assistance, and just last week we spearheaded 
a major international donor conference in Brussels that 
raised over 2 billion dollars for Somalia. 
In case anybody wonders what Somalia has to do with 
us, the answer is simple: a failed state is a threat not 
only for the immediate neighbourhood but for the whole 
world, and Afghanistan was a very clear illustration of 
this. The consequences of the complete breakdown of 
authority in Somalia affected all of us, including of course 
India, and that is why the EU decided to use the full 
range of its instruments to begin the process, which will 
necessarily be a lengthy one, to recreate full security in 
Somalia.
Occasionally one hears questions, both inside and outside 
of Europe, as to whether the EU can become an efficient 
and reliable security actor. This questioning usually 
focuses on the differences between the Member-States, 
the difficulties in achieving joint action or the impact 
of the financial and economic crisis. But the facts are a 
sufficient response to the question. Despite difficulties 
and problems, the EU has accomplished a remarkable 
feat, which would have been unthinkable 50 or 40 years 
ago: to unite 28 countries, which in various instances 
have powerful individual voices, and cooperate closely to 
export security at a global level. Moreover, the EU has in 
several cases shown an extraordinary ability to overcome 
obstacles in the past, through trial and error, reforms and 
cooperation. I am certain that this process will continue. 
In this light, I believe that the EU will continue to evolve 
as a significant security actor. 
The notion of security in an emerging globalised and 
multi-polar world encompasses new threats and challen-
ges, and there is certainly much scope for strengthening 
the co-operation between the EU and new important 
actors in international relations, such as India and China. 
They could expand their co-operation to achieve common 
goals in international fora on global and regional issues 
of common interest. They could also work together in 
areas of high importance, such as peace-keeping, crisis 
management and post-conflict reconstruction. And they 
could find common ways and share ideas for dealing with 
a wide range of global threats, such as natural disasters, 
environmental degradation or terrorist networks. As the 
example of European integration has shown, different 
experiences and ideas can produce remarkable results 
if the actors decide to share responsibility, find areas 
of convergence and work together to address common 
challenges. I believe that EU, India and China can do 
more to tackle new threats and promote peace in a new 
multi-polar world.“
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